TOLEDO-BANAGA vs. CA

  

BIBLIA TOLEDO-BANAGA and JOVITA TAN, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CANDELARIO DAMALERIO, respondent

G.R. No. 127941 | January 28, 1999

 

FACTS:

In an action for redemption filed by petitioner Banaga, the trial court declared that she had lost her right to redeem her property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at public auction to private respondent, Damalerio. Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued to private respondent over which petitioner Banaga annotated on March 3, 1983 a notice of lis pendens.

 

On June 11, 1992 petitioner Banaga tried to redeem the subject property by depositing with the trial court the amount of redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Private respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time given to her by the court in the earlier case. However, the lower court issued an order on August 7, 1992 upholding the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel private respondent's Certificates of Title and issue new titles in the name of petitioner Banaga.

 

When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 4, 1993, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 29869. On January 11, 1993, private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as another notice of lis pendens on the Certificates of Title. Three days later, the CA issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders.

 

Meanwhile, on January 7, 1993, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tan with the deed of absolute sale mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which was not yet cancelled. Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the property in question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name of private respondent. Petitioner Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name. On March 24, 1993, such titles were issued in petitioner Tan's name but it still carried the annotations of the two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning of the new title of petitioner Tan, private respondent impleaded the former in his petition in CA-G.R. No. 29869.

 

On October 28, 1993, the CA declared private respondent absolute owner of the subject property. Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued a writ of execution on December 27, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate the Certificates of Title in the name of the movant — herein private respondent:

Although there is no specific pronouncement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that reverts the titles to the land subjects of redemption to the defendant, the fact that it declared the petioner (Damalerio) as the absolute owner of the lands entitles him to writ of execution issuing from this court directing the Register of Deeds to reinstate his titles to his name. As it is implied from the decision declaring him the absolute owner of the land be reverted to him.

The Register of Deeds of the Registry of Deeds for General Santos City is hereby ordered to reinstate the title of Candelario B. Damalerio.

 

But the Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered. Accordingly, private respondent moved to cite the Register of Deeds in contempt of court which was denied, that the former's remedy is by consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration. In another order (dated March 29, 1996) the trial court likewise denied private respondent's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession ruling that the latter's remedy is a separate action to declare petitioner Tan's Certificates of Title void.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of the final and executory decision — which is to issue titles in the name of private respondent — can be compelled by mandamus taking into consideration the "formality" that the registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation.

 

RULING:

No, the execution of the final and executory decision — which is to issue titles in the name of private respondent — cannot be compelled by mandamus taking into consideration the "formality" that the registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation.

 

By arguing that petitioner Tan was a buyer in good faith, petitioners in effect raise once more the issue of ownership of the subject property. But such issue had already been clearly and categorically ruled upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court, wherein private respondent was adjudged the rightful and absolute owner thereof. The decision in that case bars a further repeated consideration of the very same issue that has already been settled with finality. To once again re-open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.

 

Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision — which is to issue titles in the name of private respondent — cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the "formality" that the registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree 1529 cited by the Register of Deeds, bears no merit. In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied with the formality of surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal system. Precisely, the Supreme Court had already affirmed the CA's judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in private respondent's name. To file another action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal. Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be rendered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.

 

In addition, the enforcement of final and executory judgment is likewise a ministerial function of the courts and does not call for the exercise of discretion. Being a ministerial duty, a writ of mandamus lies to compel its performance. Moreover, it is axiomatic that where a decision on the merits is rendered and the same has become final and executory, as in this case, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic. Thus, the so-called consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration, which is not applicable herein, was only a naive and belated effort resorted to by petitioners in order to delay execution. If petitioners desire to stop the enforcement of a final and executory decision, they should have secured the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, but which they did not avail knowing that there exist no legal or even equitable justifications to support it.

 

At any rate, the time petitioner Banaga sold the property to petitioner Tan, the latter was well aware or the interest of private respondent over the lot. Worse, at the time of the sale, petitioner Tan was buying property not registered in the seller's name. This clear from the deed of absolute sale which even mentioned that the Certificates of Title is still in the name of private respondent. It is settled that a party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate of Title. By looking at the title, however, petitioner Tan cannot feigned ignorance that the property is registered in private respondent's name and not in the name of the person selling to her. Such fact alone should have at least prompted, if not impelled her to investigate deeper into the title of her seller — petitioner Banaga, more so when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship, and would have been quite easy, as the titles still carried the two notices of lis pendens.

 

By virtue of such notices, petitioner Tan is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens. As a transferee pendente lite, she stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor and must respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor. Her interest is subject to the incident or results of the pending suit, and her Certificates of Title will, in that respect, afford her no special protection.

 

One who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his bad faith and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the owner or of an interest therein. When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot, petitioner Tan gambled on the result of litigation. She is bound by the outcome of her indifference with no one to blame except herself if she loses her claim as against one who has a superior right or interest over the property. These are the undeniable and unconverted facts found by the CA, which petitioners even quote and cite in their petition. As aptly concluded by the CA that petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith.

 

Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire better rights than her predecessor in interest for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. Such finding of bad faith is final and may not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with the courts.

 

With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a necessary incident of ownership. The adjudication or ownership to private respondent includes the delivery of possession since the defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right to retain possession of the land independently of their claim of ownership which was rejected. Otherwise, it would be unjust if a petitioner who has no valid right over the property will retain the same.

 

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against petitioners. No further proceeding will be entertained in this case.