REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF CARAG

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF CARAG

G.R. No. 155450 |  August 6, 2008

FACTS:

●     2 June 1930 – CFI Cagayan issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses Carag, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters, situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

●     1938 - pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued OCT in the name of spouses Carag.

●     1952 - OCT was cancelled and two TCTs were issued.

DENR INVESTIGATION

●     1994 - Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of DENR, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

●     The DENR Regional Executive Director created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property which reported that:

o The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Carag, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA).

●     In a Memorandum, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.

PETITIONER FILED BEFORE CA A COMPLAINT

●     On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion).

o The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928; thus, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS:

●     Private respondents maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.

1999 - petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.

 

CA: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction

 

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

●     Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property.

●     Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930.

●     Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint for Annulment of Decree has merit

 

RULING:

NO. THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF DECREE HAS NO MERIT.

●     Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, Supreme Court ruled:

o   From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person.

●     Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

●     In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose.

 

●     The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued was Act No. 2874, which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -

a)       Alienable or disposable;   

b)      Timber; and                                    

c)       Mineral lands

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.

●     Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

 

●     Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with the law.

 

●     Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.

 

●     In Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, The Court ruled:

o   “When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case.”

 

●     When the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.

 

●     Even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution."

●  When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines' complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.