TAGOLINO v. HRET
SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND
LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ
[G.R.
No. 202202. March 19, 2013.]
TOPIC: Substitution
of Candidates
FACTS:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his CoC as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party.
One of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla filed a Verified Petition alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of Colgate Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
COMELEC
1ST DIVISION: Disqualified Richard Gomez
COMELEC EN BANC: motion for reconsideration was denied
On May
5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC
together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the
Liberal Party endorsing her as the party's official substitute candidate of
her husband, Richard.
COMELEC EN BANC: approved the substitution.
During the elections, Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.
In view of the aforementioned substitution, Lucy Torres was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May
24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET
in order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that she
did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and
HRET:
declared Lucy Torres as a qualified candidate
ISSUE: W/N
Lucy Torres validly substituted Richard Gomez.
RULING:
No,
Lucy Torres did not validly substitute Richard Gomez.
Misrepresentation warrants cancellation of COC, not disqualification. When cancelled, there is no valid CoC. As such, there is no candidate. Ergo, there cannot be substitution. Substitution is proper only when the substituted is disqualified, because he or she was considered a candidate until ordered discontinued.
Disqualification
v. Cancellation of COC
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate's bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
SEC 68 |
SEC 78 |
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. |
A denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised
on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a
false representation of the same in the CoC. |
As
explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya, a candidate who is disqualified
under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he
remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because
he is not considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be
no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does
not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate
to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.
Grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC En Banc
and HRET
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified — and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled — would mean that he could have been validly substituted by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent's substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard's "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for disqualification.
It cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division's unqualified grant of Juntilla's "Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification" carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC pursuant to Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidate's CoC is in order.
In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department's finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent's substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division's ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard's CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent's substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.
Records
clearly show that:
(1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement;
(2) Juntilla's petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and
(3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification.
By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division's Resolution.
Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be circumvented and rendered nugatory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
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