LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PANFILO LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

G.R. No. 128096

January 20, 1999 

FACTS

11 MEMBERS OF KURATONG BALELENG GANG, KILLED

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

MEDIA EXPOSĔ: SUMMARY EXECUTION NOT A SHOOTOUT

SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC:

what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG

IN RESPONSE, OMBUDSMAN FORMED A PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS

Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident.

BLANCAFLOR PANEL: PNP OFFICERS ABSOLVED FROM CRIMINAL LIABLITY

This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.¹

26 RESPONDENTS (including petitioner & intervenors) INDICTED FOR MULTIPLE MURDER

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.

The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

11 INFORMATION FOR MURDER FILED IN SANDIGANBAYAN

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson = among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder² before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division,

Intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. = among the accessories after-in-the-fact.

REINVESTIGATION= LACSON ONLY CHARGED AS ACCESSORY

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,³ the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations⁵before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused⁶ was dropped from the case.

ACCUSED QUESTIONED JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN, SHOULD BE WITH RTC

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.⁷ 

They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher.

The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

SANDIGANBAYAN TRANSFERRED CASES TO QC RTC

the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR (OSP) FILED MFR: SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan.

WHILE PENDING, BILLS RE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGABAYAN WERE FILED IN CONGRESS

House Bill No. 2299¹⁰ and No. 1094¹¹ (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively),

Senate Bill No. 844¹² (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales)

Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

BILLS CONSOLIDATED & BECAME R.A. 8249 on February 5, 1997.

SANDIGANBAYAN INITIALLY DENIED MFR OF OSP, BUT LATER GRANTED IT ON THE SAME DAY…. SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

PETITIONER QUESTION CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEC 4 & SEC 7 OF RA 8249, argues:

a) [VIOLATES HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) [IT IS AN EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION]

Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.

c) LAW VIOLATES 1 TITLE-1 SUBJECT RULE IN ENACTING LAWS

The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.¹⁷

INTERVENORS ADD:

the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an EX-POST FACTO STATUTE intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.¹⁸ 

They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WOULD BE VIOLATED as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL:

filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed

ISSUE:

1. W/N RA 8249 is unconstitutional? NO

2. W/N the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers? NO

RULING:

1. W/N RA 8249 is unconstitutional?

NO. IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. ²⁰ The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution: mandated creation of Sandiganbayan

Section 4 Article XIof the 1987 Constitution: Sandiganbayan retained as anti-graft court

Presidential Decree No. 1486 created the Sandiganbayan.

Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted:

P.D. No. 1606,²² 

Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,²³ 

P.D. No. 1860,²⁴ 

P.D. No. 1861,²⁵ 

R.A. No. 7975, ²⁶ and

R.A. No. 8249.²⁷ 

JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

a)    Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

b)    City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

c)    Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

d)    Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

e)    Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

[COMMENT: Under RA 7975, this is only “PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank”]

f)     City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

g)    Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

[COMMENT: Under RA 7975, this is only “Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.”]

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them

RA 7975	RA 8249
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.	Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

FURTHER COMPARISONS

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

PETITIONER, INTERVENORS	OMBUDSMAN thru SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher.	contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.

This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office.

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.

A. NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.³⁴

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,³⁵

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.³⁶ 

TRIAL HAS NOT YET COMMENCE	TRIAL HAD ALREADY STARTED
evidence against them were not yet presented	the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents

Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,³⁷ it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.

Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court."

Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

“BIAS” OF SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICES = NOT SUFFICIENT TO NULLIFY LAW

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law.

Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

B. NOT AN EX POST FACTO LAW

One can be considered as ex post facto law:

[based on CALDER V. BULL]

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.⁴³

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.⁴⁶ 

R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;⁴⁷ or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.⁴⁸ R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.⁴⁹ Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

RA 8249 DID NOT DILUTE RIGHT TO 2-TIERED APPEAL

R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.⁵⁵ On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.

C. RA 8249 DID NOT VIOLATE 1 SUBJECT-1 TITLE RULE

The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction.

The explanation in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.

The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title⁵⁷is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.⁵⁸ Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.⁵⁹ The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts

2. W/N the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers?

NO. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. RTC HAS JURISDICTION, NOT SANDIGABAYAN

People vs. Montejo,⁶⁴ we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.⁶⁵ This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the information.

As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

Excerpts from amended information:

           

xxxx all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

xxxx [petitioner and intervenors] committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.

Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling.

Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information at the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is the factual allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

RTC HAS JURISDICTION

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,⁷³ not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained.

The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED.

The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.